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Irish Steve and Flanagan analyze why the Fire have started out so hot, and explain the importance of Chad Barrett to that success. You know it’s neither the beer nor the whiskey, nor the fact you decided to start standing in 117 instead of 118, so why are you finding it hard to recognize the Fire this season? Two words: Denis Hamlet. After ten years of standing in the bench’s background, Hamlet is already proving he was the right choice to replace that short guy with the notepad who left for New Jersey, or wherever. However, this isn’t just an article about our manager. This is for all of us who have and haven’t been paying attention to exactly how Hamlet’s strategic and motivational tactics are solidifying us as a team to be feared.
The Difference
The results are obvious to anyone who’s passed third grade math. So far in 2008, we’ve managed 13 goals in just 7 matches while opposing teams have breached Busch’s net a meager 3 times. These numbers amount to the best goal difference in MLS: +10. After their 3-2 win in San Jose, first in the east Cow Town will find they can only flaunt the second best goal difference: 14 scored and 9 allowed for +5. Yet when we compare our numbers with last season’s start, the word difference fails to capture the level to which our team productivity has increased. Under Sarachan, we had managed to score 8 goals and leak 10 through the seventh match of 2007. Even worse, we didn’t amass 13 goals in the “for” column until the Toronto home match on July 7th, our fifteenth league match of the season.
Thanks to Hamlett, we’ve finally started to fuse as a unit. When Frankowski failed to make the Chicago to New England flight two weeks ago, Hamlett was forced to start Barrett up top without a partner for the first time this season. He sent us out in a 4-2-3-1 formation. The return of Rolfe couldn’t have come at a better time. His comeback allowed Hamlett to slot Thorrington alongside Pause in the defensive half of midfield with (l-r) Mapp, Blanco, and Rolfe filling the attacking half. However, unlike Osorio, Hamlet didn’t and isn’t placing an unbalanced onus on defending. Thorrington’s midfield role is proof of this. When we have the ball, Blanco pushes up at least into the 9.5 – the hole – with Thorrington stepping up between the two wide in the channels. Pause then holds as cover behind all the midfielders and Sega and Prideaux who create numbers and further width as they journey forward on overlapping runs.
The on-field, real-time effects are myriad and deserve favorable comparison with Osorio’s dour, albeit pragmatically effective tactics. Blanco’s more advanced role allows him to conserve energy and draw fouls that lead to free kicks taken from more dangerous positions on the pitch. Also, in stark contrast to his play under Osorio, when Blanco has received the ball in our past two matches he has usually found himself on the half-line or in the opposition’s half. Too often last year he was receiving the ball from the backline deep in our own half. This forced him to play long balls into space for Barrett and/or Wanchope. Conversely, this new formation has our opposition – the two home teams – playing most of the hit-and-hope long balls. Why 4-2-3-1 Works This 4-2-3-1 has eliminated our need to play long for Barrett or anyone else. Hamlet’s tactics have created defensive triangles and squares all over the field. These squares and triangles are designed to allow us to hunt the ball in packs, eliminate defensive mismatches, and play on a shorter field by forcing turnovers higher up the pitch. Mismatches in our favor have been ample, because these triangles and squares are also designed to turn offensive and launch counter-attacks with every turnover. Our high-field pressure is such that we are forcing a significant amount of turnovers in positions that left both New England and DC vulnerable and exposed at the back. Albright and Peralta’s numerous and disgracefully late challenges on Blanco and others support this notion. Under Osorio however, such turnovers nearly always came in or near our defensive third.
Credit for the tremendous work rate we are presently displaying should be spread across the board, because this system breaks down unless each and every player is willing to cover or show for a pass. All this is easier said than done. Again, think back to the full first half of last season. We were shit: Colorado 0-0 at home, 1st of July, anyone? During the second half, Osorio created midfield roles that were too specialized. The near diamond he often played at home would forced Soumare, a rookie, to hold the midfield alone while Mapp and whoever else stepped in out on the right were forced as wide as possible. Wanchope’s inability to move left Barrett doing the work of two with only half the service one striker would need to bang a dent in any match. Again, with alarming frequency Blanco was fed the ball too deep inside our own half. Our inability to move the ball forward was obvious: too much space between our defenders with the ball at their feet and our attackers. After these deep turnovers, it was just too easy for teams to lock us in. The passes necessary to break such high pressure were frequently aimed at largely isolated players too far up the pitch. The last half-hour or so of the away leg at RFK is a perfect example. Hamlett’s tactics have simultaneously reduced the space the ball must cover to reach another player while increasing the number of passing options any player can find immediately available to him.
Nearly every time My-50 pointed the camera at Jay Heaps, he could be seen waving his hands forward, begging the New England midfield and front line to push up and give their back three some breathing room. They couldn’t, though. When they penetrated into our attacking third, we consistently forced them back as far back as Fat, err, Matt Reis. Then, finding our off-the-ball pressure sufficient to deny any simple outlet pass, Reis or one of their backline were forced to play long into space for Smith, Mansally, or Cristman. Over and over again we locked them into their own half. Days later in DC, after weathering early flourishes, Barrett nodded down for Mapp. Thirty-eight minutes in, the new system was again paying dividends. The Importance of Chad These dividends start with Barrett: a man too too often on the wrong end of harsh parking lot criticism. Yes, he missed against KC. In the grand scheme of it all, so what? Strikers have and will miss simpler chances. It’s about time we start recognizing, discussing, and supporting him for all the positives he brings to the team. His work rate is second to none throughout the duration of any match. Even in heavy traffic, his first touch is fantastic, and so far this season, his ability to link with anyone making a forward run has been slick and efficient. Two goals (both match winners for an average of 1 goal for every 4.5 shots on goal) and three assists (one a match winner) in seven matches is fine return for a striker who can often be found defending alongside his fullbacks. His overall contribution to the team cannot and should not – though too often is – underestimated. Yes, wouldn’t it be lovely if he would score nineteen or twenty a season, but in 2007 only Angel and Emilio managed such returns, respectively. Both didn’t go as deep as Barrett in last year’s playoffs, and both are now DPs as well. Though, only one of the two has entered this season with a double chin folding over his bananas and cake/beer gut. Teamwork
Twellman’s absence this season is evidence we should be fearful of cultivating dependency on any one player. If we continue scoring goals as a team, Barrett doesn’t need to score a glut. Blanco and Thorrington’s three a piece from midfield take the weight off and highlight the efficacy of our 4-2-3-1. Blanco, like Barrett, shouldn’t have to be the focal point of all our productivity. Almost like a new signing, Thorrington has been nothing short of a revelation. His ability to break up the tempo and continuity of opposition attacks (with Pause doling out an equal amount of destruction) and then support our attacks with simple passes appears to inspire the entire team. Also, opponents are having a torrid time tracking his late runs from deep. To offer up a cliché that does him limited justice, he just seems to be everywhere, and right where we need him at vital moments.
The same can be said of Bakary Soumare. He takes ownership of every inch of the field he can cover. Right now, he’s the most dominant center half in MLS. When the ball is in air, forget about it. When it comes to Bakary winning the ball, the term 50-50 loses all significance. Announcers should start saying 95-5 instead. I don’t care who he’s jumping against, Bakary is just winning everything. He’s not afraid to smack or get smacked in the process either. Credit Hamlett for finally moving him back into the position he played at UVA, his natural position. The addition of Prideaux can’t be underestimated either. He lends a simple, necessary assuredness to Bakary’s right that couples beautifully with Diego’s guile and experience on his left. Both have been great. Also, it goes without saying, but Segares is the best full back in the league.
Point being, at the moment we look excellent from front to back. The efficacy of our 4-2-3-1 was never more evident than during the build up that lead to Rolfe’s opener at New England. It was a team goal of the highest order. The ball never left the grass. Across twelve passes, it touched the feet of seven players before being slashed past Reis over ninety or so yards from the attack’s origin. It went like this: Busch – Sega – Mapp – Blanco – Mapp – Pause – Sega – Pause – Mapp – Blanco – Thorrington – Rolfe. Hopefully, we’ll all look back in about five months and be able to dog ear both this goal and the New England match as the flashpoint of a wildly successful season. So, regardless of all the beer and whiskey, 117 or 118, keep your fingers crossed and continue to stand and deliver.
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